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MOTION 
No. 70-283 OT 1971 
Adams v. Williams 
This is a motion filed by the District Attorney of NY 
County to be allowed to argue as amicus for 20 minutes. I 
have attached the cert memo in this case to remind you of the 
issues in this search and seizure case. Rule 44 of this Court 
says that such requests, unless filed by the SG or a State, 
"are not favored." I see nothing in the request which con-
vinces me that this request to argue orally should be granted. 
The points he wishes to make can be made effectively in an 
amicus brief. 
DENY LAH 
+ ( r!-f..rf'l-y ~7~ 
{j_R_.rk-v~.._' t!.~-M- ~z...-w~ I~ w~( _C'_J~ • ~- <( !:L q:;.J I 
(C..u.-f. ~ ~ ~ 'kk.._:f-~ }· ~'/;. 2.- <: ,G . d .~~~ 
~.J-w._._~. ~~---'1 <¥- ~_,_ . ~, ll..U ~is . ' . /l~ 
No. 70 ... 283 OT 1971 c.,,_.\....ul'..,_. · ~~o-IL--1~ -~JI .~ <::,.~. f.<J 
Adams, Warden Connecticut Prison v. Wilii ams :. '"~ 7-v .- . 
Cert to CA 2 (en banc .. -Per Curiam; Hays dissenting) ~-uLur' ~· ff t...l ,....,..._;' 7 c- .--
HOLD FOR FUL~OURT . I~ .. 
HABEAS CORPUS 1 4th AMENDMENT ( 5' lq.._ '1-.- ;;:.:._!c) I •-/ • 1/1/ 
Resp. was convicted in a Conn. state TC of (1) possession of a 
firearm, (2) possession of heroin, and (3) possession of a weapon 
in his motor vehicle. After losing on appeal in the state courts, 
Resp filed a habeas corpus petition in the USDC D Conn. His sole 
claim was that evidence used against him in the state court (hand gun, 
-----~-· ... 
heroin, and a machete) was seized in violation of the 4th Amendment. -- --The USDC denied the petition and the CA 2 aff'd (Danaher & Hays; 
Friendly dissenting). However, the case was then reviewed by >_·· 
the CA 2 en bane and reversed with Judge Hays dissenting. The State 
subsequently applied for cert. from this Court. 
The undisputed facts upon which the en bane opinion relies are --as follows. While walking his rounds in Bridgeport, Conn. at 2a00 a.m.p 
a police officer was told by an informer that a man (Resp), who was 
c:. a.. t- - -···-- - -
seated in a parke~across the streetp had a gun tucked into his 
waistband and narcotics on his person. The officer knew the informer 
since he had on one prior occasion supplied information in an unrelated 
matter. On the basis of the informer's statement the officer decided 
to investigate further. He approached the car and asked Resp to 
get out. Resp rolled down the window and the officer immediately 
reached in and grabbed the gun from Resp's waistband. After ordering 
Resp from the car, the officer searched him and found the heroin; he 
also discovered the machete under the seat in the car. 
The 4th Amendment issue raised by this factual circumstance 
f 
t-Jre. . 
ocuses onAquest1on whether the police officer had the right .~o 
approach Resp and forcibly detain him. Under conventional search-and-
seizure law the State has sought to justify the officer's conduct on 
r 
either of two theories. First, it was contended below that the 
officer had probable cause to believe that Resp was committing a 
~-I uJ. 
crime (possessing narcotics and a weapon). The officer's only ~~ 
vv-r~-r 
information was the statement of the informer. In the absence of , 
.A-'~ f. 
~~ either independent corroboration of the informant's story or a ~ 
greater history of the informant's proven reliability in reporting 
other similar cttiminal activity, this information provided the 
officer with an insufficient basis for an arrest. A number of this 
Court's precedents dealing with probable cause where the officer 
Spinelli v. 
------------------
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964); Draper v. United Stateso 358 U.S. 307 (1959). The CA 2 
en bane opinion cites these cases as controlling and, indeed, the 
State appears to have abandoned this claim in their cert petition. 
The second possible justification for the officer's conduct, 
~~~----~~~----
and the only one that is seriously at issue at this point, is the 
rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969). In Terry the Court 
held that police officers could approach and detain briefly persons 
whom the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe are engaged in ~ 
criminal activity. Pursuant to such a "stop," the officer may -
conduct a limited "frisk" for weapons if he has a reasonable basis -__....., 
for believing that the person might be armed. The facts of this case 
would appear to fall directly within the Terry rule. The officer, 
~
on the basis of what the informer told him, certainly had reasonable 
suspicion that Resp was engaged in criminal activity. Clearly, the 
responsible course for him to pursue was to approach Resp and explore 
the circumstances further. And, having solid reason to believe that 
.r 
Resp was armed, it was quite appropriate for him to reach into the 
waistband and remove ~he weapon. The 3-judge panel opinion relied 
The en bane Per Curiam, however, rejects the f entirely on Terry. 
l Terry reasoning in a single sentencea 
"We conclude that on the basis of the facts then known 
to him, (the officer) had neither probable cause to arrest 
(Resp) nor any other sufficient cause for reaching into (Resp's) 
waistband •••• : See Terry v, Ohio." 
The CA tells us nothing in further explanation as to why this case 
is not squarely governed by Terry but J. Friendly's dissent to the ----
________..- I r ......__ \ '-. 
panel opinion provides two poss.ible explanations. First, Friendly 
. :fY./ a~s at length that Terry d~ to "crimes of possession." 
~~ In his view, an officer is justified in detaining and questioning 
~ persons whom he believes are about to commit, or have just committed, 
~~ some violent crime (such as robbery, assault, etc). On the other 
~ hand, he contends that an officer is not justified in detaining persons whom he believes are merely committing possessory crimes 
~~ ( o.ch as possession of we,apons or drugs). To allow an officer to 
~~top and frisk someone whom he believes to be committing solely the 
~ crime of possessing a weapon, Friendly contends, constitutes a 
search and seizure on less than probable cause-~an act clearly 
proscribed by the 4th Amendment. Furthermore, to allow an officer 
to s· '? Cg stop a heroin addict and conduct a protective patdown 
for weapons Friendly finds objectional because such a search is 
frequently likely to uncover evidence of drug possession, i.e. 
he fears that patdowns for weapons would be pretextual sea~ches 
for narcotics in cases where probable cause to believe that the 
person is possessing narcotics is lacking. The Court's opinion 
in Terry does not on its face support such a distinction but it is 
true that the facts in that case involve suspicion of a robbery and 
not a mere possessory offense. 
The second possible explanation for the en bane opinion's terse 
disposition of Terry rises out of a serious factual problem. Judge 
Friendly points out that at the first suppression hearing in the 
state court the officer testified and made no mention of the informer. 
ct 
Rather, the officer testified that he was in a radio car and responed 
" to a police signal to go to the Williams car. Not until the 
second hearing did the officer tell the story about the informer. 
The identity of the informer was never disclosed despite the defendant's 
repeated requests. As Friendly points out, appellate courts are 
bound by the supported findings of fact of the state trial court 
and that c~urt did believe the officer's second story. I believe, 
~----------------------------
however, that Friendly and the majority of the full court were 
seriously troubled by this total change of stories by the officer 
and the absence of corroboration which the informer, had he been 
made available, could have provided. 
I am inclined to recommend that this case be granted in order 
for the Court to consider the applicability of ·Terry to this type 
of factual pattern. I am strongly persuaded that the officer, if 
his story is to be believed, did nothing unreasonbale and that 
Terry should be held to cover the crime of illegal possession of 
a hand gun. Police officers who have reasonable grounds to 
~
suspect that a person is armed (especially in an urban community 
late at night) should have the power to approach him and question 
him to determine whether he has a license and why he is carrying 
the weapon. Certainly, also, he should disarm that person prior 
to any discussion. Nevertheless, significant ' Supreme Court opinions 
ought not be delivered in cases in which the facts are tainted with 
the possibility of fabrication. I would therefore suggest that,if 
you believe the case otherwise cert-worthy, prior to voting on the 
petition at conference you should direct the clerk's office to 
~ call for the complete transcript in order to ascertain whether the 
officer's apparently contradictory stories can be reconciled. 
CALL FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH A VIEW TO GRANT IAH 
Con£. 3/17/72 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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No. 70-283 OT 1971 
Adams v. Williams 
Cert to CA 2 
DISCUSS 
This is a motion filed by the ACLU to file a brief 
amicus in the above named case, which will probably -........_ 
be argued next Term. This is the case raising the 4th 
Amendment question about the propriety of a nighttime 
search of the occupant of a car--should Terry apply to 
possessory crimes. 
The case raises an important 4th Amendment question. 
The motion should be granted. 
GRANT LAH 
Conf. 3/31/72 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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lfp/ ss lee 4/5/72 
BENCH MEMO 
No. 70-283 ADAMS v. WILLIAMS 
Larry's cert memo in this case is entirely adequate as a "bench memo". 
I have now read the entire appendix, including the findings of fact 
by the Connecticut state trial court, the evidence at the state suppression 
hearing, the opinion of the U.S. District Court on the habeas corpus petition 
(the District Court Judge accepting the state court's findings of fact), the 
opinion of CA 2 en bane, with Judge Hays' dissenting opinion. 
I have also reread Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, which seems to me to 
be controlling. 
A good summary of the facts is found in the district~ court's 
opinion - Appendix 52. In a sentence, a police officer in a high crime district 
at 2:15 a. m. , on the basis of a tip from an informer known to be reliable by 
the officer frisked a man sitting in a car, finding a gun in his waistband. 
Probable cause was not necessary under these circumstances. Terry v. Ohio. 
No. 70-283 ADAMS v. WILLIAMS Argued 4/10/72 
~~U>-<A- -T~v~ · ' 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 1, 1972 
Re: No. 70-283 -Adams v. Williams 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me . 
Sincerely, 
;+-
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Bill, 
~tt.pl·tmc <q~11trt of tire Jl.Tnitcb .§tatcs 
21JasJrington, p. (!f. 2J.lbi>t;J 
June 1, 1972 
70-283 - Adams v. Williams 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in this 
case, with twc suggestions: 
( 1) I would hope that you might consider deleting 
the first two complete sentences on page 6. I think they do 
not really add anything to the probable cause finding, and, 
indeed, even detract from it. 
(2) I suggest that the citation of Chimel v. Cali-
fornia be deleted at the bottom of page 6, and that there be 
substituted therefor citations to Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160. 
My reasons for this suggestion are twofold. First, it is my 
recollection that the search in this case occurred before the 
Chimel decision, and we have held that that decision is not 
retroactive. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797; Williams 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 646. Secondly, I doubt whether 
Chimel (which involved an unlawful search of a man's house) 
w::mld, in any event, be an apposite authority for the lawful-
ness of the automobile search in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
..§u.prtm:t ~omt of tltt 'Jllttitclt ~ttttt~ 
~lUllfi:ttgtott. 1(}. ~· 2!l,?J!.~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 2, 1972 
Re: No. 70-283 - Adams v. Williams 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
i {i. rJ. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
~nvrtutt (!JtltWt 41f tlrl'~nitrb ~tnttn 
~t~ct£t~itt~hnt, JD. <q. :W.Gn~ 
Ct1AMBERS OF 




Re: No. 70-283 - Adams v. Williams 
Please join me in your dissent 
circulated June second. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
CC: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 0,. 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
;§JtFttnt Qf4tltrlttf tltt 1!tttittb ~tatt.a­
~M!p:n:ghm. ~. Qf. Wbi)}~ 
Re: 70-283 - Adams v. Williams 
Dear Potter: 
June 5, . 
Thank you for the suggestions in your memorandum of 
June 1. Each of your points will be reflected in the next 
circulation of the proposed opinion. 
Mr. Jus t ice Stewart 





.§u.vumt <.qcurt of trrt 'Jllni:ttb j)tahs 
'ma:s!littgtolt, tn. <.q. Zllbi'l>~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 5, 1972 
Re: No. 70-283 - Adams v. Williams 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely,~ 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
-rHE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
.;§np-rtmt C!f~ud ~f tlfe ~trite~ .:§Utttg 
~agfrittgttm.!B. <!f. 2ll~'!-.;t 
June 6, 1972 
No. 70-283 -- Adams v. Williams 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
June 7, 1972 
Re: No. 70-283 Adams v. Williams 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
,l:l·, 1 '· 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
( 6/7/72--LAH p Res Adams v. Williams, No. 70~283 
Judge a 
Attached are the followings (1) Justice Rehnquist's 
first draft of a majority opinion in this search-and-sei-
zure case; (2) Justice Marshall's dissent; (3) Justice 
Brennan's dissent; (4) Justice Douglas' dissent; (5) 
joining notes from the CJp WHite, Stewart, Blackmun. 
Rehnquist's opinion is acceptable and I recommend that 
you join it. I am troubled about the case because he did 
not meet headon the problem ra~sed and discussed at 
length in the Second Circuit--namely whether Terry v. Ohio 
applies to possessory offenses. Tacitly, now, this Court 
concludes that it does. This is a major extension of 
~ 
Terry, and although it is a step which I view as proper and 
indeed almost inevitable, I am disappointed that the Court 
does n0t meet it with more assurance and force. The 
dissenters are justified in their concern that Terry, which 
was initially designed to be a narrow and refined exception 
to the otherwise ironclad warrant rule, has been enlarged 
almost by fiat. Nonetheless, I see no benefit in your 
writing separately. As you have pointed out, no opinion 
fully suits everyone and if we wrote in every case that 
we find troublesome the Term would never end. 
Other than dodging the tough issue, I think the majority 
opinion is well written and thorough in its treatment of the 
matters it touches. 
The three dissents add nothing which should cause you 
to change your vote. (Justice Douglas' dissent is worth 
reading because it is amusing in that it bears no relation 
--2--
to the case before the Court. Indeed, I suspect that you 
will find his statements on gun control and the breadth 
of gmvernment power to regulate in this area most acceptable. 
If those remarks were made in a case before the Court I 
would ask you to join him.) 
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To: The Chief Justice 
Kr. Justice Douglas 
Kr. Justice Brennan 
Kr. Justice Stewart 
Kr. Justice White 
Kr. Justice MarRhall 
1st DRAFT 
Kr _J.wrtioe Blackmun 
~tioePowe~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST~ Rehnquist, J. 
No. 70--283 




Recirculated: ____________ _ 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
rJune - , 1972] 
MR. Jl:STICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Respondent Robert Williams was convicted in a Con-
necticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun 
found during a "stop and frisk ," as well as possession 
of heroin that was found during a full search incidental 
to his weapons arrest. After respondent's conviction 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 157 
Conn. 114, 249 A. 2d 245 ( 1968), this Court denied 
certiorari. 395 U. S. 927 ( 1969). Williams' petition 
for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the Dis-
trict Court and by a divided panel of the Second Circuit, 
436 F. 2d 30 (1970), but on rehearing en bane the Court 
of Appeals granted relief. 441 F. 2d 394 (1971). That 
court held that evidence introduced at Williams' trial 
had been obtained by an unlawful search of his person 
and car, and thus the state court judgments of convic-
tion should be set aside. Since we co11clude that the 
policeman's actions here conformed to the standards 
this Court laid down in Terry Y. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1068). 
we reverse. 
Police Sgt. John Connolly was alone early in the 
morning on car patrol duty in a high crime area of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut. At approximately 2:15 a.m. 
70-283-0PINION 
2 ADA:\18 v. WILLIA~lS 
a person known to Sgt. Connolly approached his cruiser 
and informed him that an individual seated in a nearby 
vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his 
waist. 
After calling for assistance on his car radio, Sgt. Con-
nolly approached the vehicle to investigate the inform-
ant's report. Connolly tapped on the car window and 
asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. 
When Williams rolled down the window instead, the ser-
geant reached into the car and removed a fully loaded 
revolver from Williams' waistband. The gun had not 
been visible to Connolly from outside the car, but it was 
in precisely the place indicated by the informant. Wil-
liams was then arrested by Connolly for unlawful posses-
sion of the pistol. A search incident to that arrest was 
conducted after other officers arrived. They found sub-
stantial quantities of heroin on Williams' person and 
in the car, :mel they found a machete and a second 
revolver hidden in the automobile. 
Respondent contends that the initial seizure of his 
pistol, upon which rested the later search and seizure 
of other weapons and narcotics, was not .i ustified by 
the informant's tip to Sgt. Connolly. He claims that 
absent a more reliable informant, or some corroboration 
of the tip, the policeman's actions '"ere unreasonable 
under the standards set forth in Terry Y. Ohio, supra. 
In Terry this Court recognized that "a police officer 
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner approach a person for the pmpose of investigat-
ing possible criminal behavior even though there is no 
probable cause to make an arrest." 392 U. S., at 22. 
The Fomth Amendment does not require a policeman 
who lacks the precise level of information necessary 
for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders 
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On 
70--283-0PIN IOK 
ADAl\lS v. WILLIAMS 3 
the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence 
of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. 
See id., at 23. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, 
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the 
status quo momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known 
to the officer at the time. Id., at 21-22; sec Gaines v. 
Craven, 448 F. 2d 1236 (CA9 1971); United States v. 
Unverzagt, 424 F. 2d 396 (CAS 1070). 
The Court recognized in Terry that the policeman 
making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be 
denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack 
by a hostile suspect. "When an officer is justified in 
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior 
he is investigating at close range is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others," he may conduct 
a limited protective search for concealed weapons. Id., 
at 24. The purpose of this limited search is not to 
discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to 
pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and 
thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary 
and reasonable "·hether or not carrying a concealed 
weapon violated any applicable state la\Y. So long as 
the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop ' and has 
reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dan--
gerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in 
scope to this protective purpose. I d., at 30. 
Applying these principles to the present case we be-
lieve that Sgt. Conno1ly acted justifiably in responding 
to his informant's tip. The informant was known to 
him personally and had provided him with information 
in the past. Unlike the situation that obtains in the 
1 The State doc~ not contend that Williams acted voluntarily in 
rolling down the window of his car. 
70-283-0PINION 
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case of an anonymous telephone tip, for example, the 
informer here came forward personally to give infonna-
tion that was immediately verifiable at the scene. In-
deed, under Connecticut law, the informer herself might 
have been subject to immediate arrest for making a 
false complaint had Sgt. Connolly's investigation proven 
the tip incorrect.2 Thus, while the Court's decisions 
indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have 
been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search war-
rant, see, e. g., Spinelli Y. United States, 393 U. f3. 410 
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the infor-
mation carried enough indicia of reliability to justify 
the officer's forcible stop of Williams. 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent's 
argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk 
can only be based on the officer's personal observation, 
rather than on information supplied by another person. 
Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence com-
ing to a policeman on the scene, may vary grea.tly in 
their value and reliability. One simple rule will not 
cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking 
in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police 
response or require further investigation before a forc-
ible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in 
some situations-for example, when the victim of a 
street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a 
description of his assailant, or when a credible informer 
warns of a specific impending crime-the subtleties of the 
hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police 
response. 
While properly investigating the activity of a person 
who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a con-
~Section 53-168 of the Connecticut General Statutes, in force at 
the time of these eYents, providrd that a "person who knowingly 
makes to any police officer ... a false report or a false complaint 
alleging that a crime or crime~ ha\'C been committed" is guilty of 
a misdemeanor. 
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cealed weapon and who "·as sitting alone in a car in a 
high crime area at 2: 15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly 
had ample reason to fear for his safety.3 When Williams 
rolled down his "·inclow, rather than complying with 
the policeman's request to step out of the car so that 
his movements could more easily be seen, the revolver 
allegedly at Williams' waist became an even greater 
threat. Under these circumstances the policeman's ac-
tion in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought 
to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed 
to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reason-
able. The loaded gun sei~ed as a re,sult of this intru-
sion was therefore admissible at Williams' trial. Terry 
v. Ohio, supra, at 30. 
Once Sgt. Connolly had found the gun precisely where· 
the informant had predicted, probable cause existed to 
arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapon. 
Probable cause to arrest depends "upon whether, at the 
moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circum-
stances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and' 
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 
that the [suspect] had committed or was committing 
an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964) .. 
In the present case the policeman found Williams in 
possession of a gun in precisely the place predicted by 
the informant. This tended to corroborate the relia-
bility of the informer's further report of narcotics, and 
8 Figures reported by the Federau Bureau of Investigation indi-
cnte that 125 policrmrn were murdered in 1971, with all but five 
of them having been killed by gunshot wounds. Federal Bureau of 
Innstigalion Law Enforcement Bulletin, February 1972, p. 33. 
According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings oc-
curred when a police officer approached a su~pect scat eel in an auto-
mobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical EYaluation, 
54 J. Cri.m. L. C. & P . S. 93 (1963). 
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together with the surrounding circumstances certainly 
suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the 
gun. It is true, as respondent points out, that gun 
possession is legal in Connecticut if the individual has 
a permit. But nothing occurred in the course of Sgt. 
Connolly's encounter with Williams to suggest that Wil-
liams might have such a permit, and it is undisputed, of 
course, that he did not in fact have one. Probable 
cause does not require the same type of specific evidence 
of each element of the offense as would be Heeded to 
support a conviction. See Draper v. United States, 
358 U. S. 307, 311-312 (1959). Rather, the court will 
evaluate generally the circumstances at the time of 
the arrest to decide if the officer had probable cause for 
his action: 
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they arc the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians. 
act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175 
(1949). 
See also id., at 177. Under the circumstances surround-
ing Williams' possession of the gun seized by Sgt. Con-
nolly, the arrest on the weapons charge was supported 
by probable cause, and the search of his person and of 
the car incident to that arrest was lawful. Chimel v. 
California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 (1969). The fruits of the 
search were therefore properly admitted at Williams' 
trial, and the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a con-
trary conclusion. 
Reversed. 
